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Recent neo-Keynesian literature on the business cycle assigns a
major role to shifts in the functional distribution of income.
Kaldor,1 Duesenberry,2 Hickman,3 and others have pointed out
that the systematic shift between profits and other forms of in-
come during cyclical swings in income, implies a systematic varia-
tion in the over-all saving rate.The propensity to save out of
profits—particularly corporate profits—is substantially higher than
the propensity to save out of other forms of income.As a con-
sequence, the over-all marginal propensity to save out of total
gross national income is much higher during cyclical fluctuations
than the average long-run saving rate.Viewed another way, the
cyclical change in disposable personal income is less than propor-
tional to the cyclical change in total gross income, not only be-
cause of the behavior of transfer payments and government tax
receipts, but also because of the shift in income distribution be-
tween retained profits and earned personal income.In addition,
therefore, to the automatic stabilizing effect of fluctuations in the
personal saving rate, which characterizes the "ratchet" or "per-
manent income" hypotheses, there exists the very significant
stabilizing impact of systematic cyclical shifts in income distribu-
tion.
Because of the differential savings rates out of profits and other
forms of income, the endogenous mechanism by which initial
shocks are propagated throughout the economy cannot be articu-
lated without specifying the functional relationship between
changes in income and the distribution of those changes among the
Noit: The preparation of this paper was aided by a grant from the Graduate
School, Indiana University. The author's researchassistant, Robert Schock,
contributed importantly to all stages of the project.Stuart Erhoim assisted in
the statistical compilation.
Nicholas Kaldor, "Economic Growth and the Problem of Inflation," Eco-
nomica,August 1959, see especially pp. 214—220.
2 Duesenberry,Business Cycles and Economic Growth, New York, 1958,
Chapter 3.See also James Duesenberry, Otto Eckstein, and Gary Gromm, "A
Simulation of the United States Economy in Recession," Econometrica, October
1960, pp. 781—786.
Bert Hickman, Growth and Stability of the Postwar Economy, Washington,
D.C., 1960, pp. 221—232.
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various factors of production.This paper attempts to provide a
set of functional relationships which illuminate the factors affect-
ing cyclical shifts in income distribution.Its orientation, however,
is not mainly towards an explanation of short-run shifts in the
distribution of income for its own sake.Rather it concentrates
on those aspects of the income distribution process which them-
selves affect the level and rate of change in income and output.
As a consequence major attention is devoted to an explanation of
the cyclical behavior of corporate profits, although some analysis
has also been made of changes in other income shares.
In Table 1, changes in nonfarm private gross national income,
gross corporate profits, gross retained profits, and disposable in-
come from cyclical peaks to cyclical troughs have been tabulated
for the downturns of the past forty years.In every case, the
ratio of the decline in gross corporate profits4 to the decline in gross
national income is substantially greater than the average long-run
ratio of profits to income.And in turn, since dividend payments
are a lagged function of past profits and dividends, the ratio of the
decline in gross retained profits to the decline in total gross profits
tends to be very high.Reflecting these relationships, the ratio of
the decline in disposable income to the decline in gross national
income is significantly smaller, during all but the major depressions,
than the long-run average ratio of disposable to total income.It
may be noted that disposable income tended to rise, relative to total
income, during the downturns of 1924 and 1927, and in these
instances the relation of disposable income to GNP could not be
explained by automatic changes in taxes and transfer payments.
There is one further feature of Table 1 which warrants com-
ment.The fall in gross profits relative to the fall in GNP in
1929—3 3 was much smaller than the relative decline in profits
during milder recessions.In particular, the proportion of income
declines absorbed by gross corporate profits, and more noticeably
by retained profits, in the postwar recessions was a good bit larger
than in 1929—3 3 and, in the case of retained profits, somewhat
larger than in 1937—38.(Without quarterly data for the 1920's
it is difficult to make relevant comparisons for the 1924 and 1927
4Weusegross profits (i.e., profits before taxes plus depreciation) as the relevant
variable, not only because it is gross margins which are relevant for a determina-
tion of disposable income, but also because, at least in the short run, changes in
depreciation and taxes are assumed to be borne by the corporations and not
shifted;i.e., the behavior of grossprofitmargins is determined by economic
factors, while net profits may be viewed as an accounting residual.
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TABLE I
CHANGE IN NONFARM PRIVATE GNP AND SELECTED COMPONENTS, RECESSION PERIODS














1923—24 —.2 —1.3 —1.2 +1.7 +4.8
1926—27 —.3 —2.5 —3.2 +2.5 +3.1
1929—33 —55.2 —20.4 —14.2 —41.4 —24.6
1937—38 —8.4 —4.0 — .7 —8.5 —2.2
4Q1948-2Q1949 —7.0 —4.3 —4.0 —1.4 +3.0
2Q1953-IQ1954 —12.8 —6.7 —6.4 —1.0 —2.8
3Q1957-1Q1958 —19.4 —8.7 —8.5 —4.3 —4.0
NOTE: Except for consumption outlays, the data are deflated by the GNP implicit
deflator.Consumption outlays for 1922—28 are the constant dollar consumption figures
given in Simon Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy: its Formation and Financing,
Princeton for NBER, 1961, Appendix Table R-2, cols. 1, 4, and 7.The 1929—59 con-
sumption data are Department of Commerce estimates.Other data are described in
Appendix 3 to this paper.
aProfitsare before taxes and are adjusted for inventory valuation.
recessions.)5Does this reflect a structural change in the cyclical
shift in income distribution, or does it reflect the fact that the
absorption of income declines by gross profits tends to become
smaller the further income declines?If the former is true, then
the structural change has strengthened the automatic stabilizers in
the economy; but if the latter is the case, then we may conclude
that the stabilizing influence of cyclical shifts in income distribu-
tion tends to weaken as the economy moves further into recession.
More precisely, insofar as there is a shift away from profits towards
personal income during recessions, the value of the multiplier is
reduced and the secondary effects of an initial shock to the
economy are damped.But insofar as the rate of shift away from
profits becomes smaller the further income declines, the "damping
factor" begins to lose its strength, and the secondary consumption
effects of further declines in income become larger.The im-
portance of this question for cyclical analysis is obvious.Hence,
a large part of the analysis in this paper has been devoted to deter-
mining whether the marginal ratio of profit change to GNPchange
is itself a function of the rate or extent of the GNPchange.
One word of caution.The analysis is confined to cyclical
shifts in income distribution. We have left to Messrs. Solow and
Harold Barger's quarterly income data, which are available for the 1920's and
1930's, do not include the corporate product data required for the regression
equations of this paper.
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Lebergott the task of disentangling the factors affecting secular
shifts in factor shares.The problem they deal with, we have
hidden away in a drawer labeled "time trend," in the belief that
the cyclical variance in factor shares can be legitimately analyzed
without a full-blown treatment of the secular variance.
All of the analysis is carried out in terms of private nonfarm in-
come and product.In minor recessions the behavior of farm
income and output is largely autonomous with respect to the be-
havior of total GNP.In part, this stems from the fact that
"autonomous" variations in supply, due to weather, combined with
the inelasticity of demand for most farm products, tend to produce
changes in farm income which have little relation to the over-all
behavior of the economy. The exclusion of the farm sector from
the analysis makes the results less general.Its inclusion, however,
would have required a fairly elaborate agricultural model, the
construction of which is beyond the competence and outside the
inclinations of the author.
The Share of Gross Corporate Profits
The share of gross corporate retained profits (corporate profits
before taxes + IVA + depreciation —dividends)in gross national
income, is, as we have noted, a major determinant of the ratio of
disposable income to gross national income.If, when income
declines cyclically, the share of gross retained profits falls, this im-
plies that the marginal ratio of gross retained profits to GNPis
larger than the average ratio, and conversely that the marginal
ratio of the change in disposable income, other things being equal,
is smaller than its average ratio; hence, disposable income fluctuates
less than proportionately with changes in total income.







=grossproduct originating in corporations
Y =nonfarmprivate gross national product (=grossna-
tional income).




The first basic relationship—retained profits relative to tota.1
profits—has been carefully investigated by Lintner,6 and no
attempt is made in this paper to extend his findings (although we
do comment on their significance).Our major concern is with
the other two relationships.
Insofar as the share of corporate product in total product is
systematically related to the cyclical behavior of the economy, the
share of gross profits in GNP cannot be explained without explain-
ing the relations between corporate product and total product.
We turn first, however, to gross profits as a share of corporate
gross product.
GROSS PROFITS AS A SHARE OF CORPORATE GROSS PRODUCT
The initial hypothesis we have tested is that the share of gross
profits in corporate gross product is composed of two elements:
1. A secular component, which may change slowly over time
in response to such factors as changes in factor scarcities,
changing degree of monopoly, non-neutral innovations, etc.
2. A cyclical component, which responds to deviations in cor-
porate product from its full capacity "norm."This com-
ponent has zero value when corporate product is at its normal
full capacity level.
Apart from long-run secular changes, the gross profit share will
thus vary about a normal ratio as gross corporate product varies
about its "normal" full capacity level.This is a "ratchet" theory
of profits, with the modification that the prior peak ratchet ele-
ment tends to move up over time.7Thus the share of gross profits
will decline, even if corporate product is stable, so long as capacity
is growing.
John Lintner, "Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends,
Retained Earnings, and Taxes," American Economic Review, May 1956.
'Edwin Kuh, on whose imaginative study("Profits, Profit Markups, and
Productivity; an Examination of Corporate Behavior Since 1947," in U.S. Congress,
Joint Economic Committee, Employment, Growth and Price Levels, Part 15,
1960) this paper heavily leans, uses a similar approach to explain the behavior of
prices and productivity in the corporate sector.
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Other authors have used a straight ratchet theory to explain
corporate profit behavior..8Theoretically this isless satisfying
than the excess capacity theory which we advance here.Theory
would lead one to choose an excess capacity hypothesis on two
grounds.First, as output falls relative to capacity, unit overhead
costs rise, with resulting lower profit margin.Since we have
included depreciation in the gross margin figure, the relevant over-
head costs here exclude depreciation.This rise in overhead costs
per unit, especially salaries and interest, and the consequent down-
ward pressure on the profit share, should occur even if output does
not decline absolutely, so long as capacity rises relative to output.
Secondly, a rise in excess capacity should put pressure on profit
margins via its influence on ex ante markups.Under orthodox
price theory this is quite obvious.But even if one believes that
some sort of full cost pricing practice characterizes American in-
dustry, it is clear that the markups are not completely immune to
the pressure of excess supply.Finally, the excess capacity hypo-
thesis can help explain the phenomenon which often occurs during
the later stages of a boom, i.e., profit margins decline during a
period in which the absolute level of income is still rising. A pure
ratchet theory could not account for this fact.
The term "excess capacity" has so far been used in a very loose
sense.Theoretical considerations would indicate that what we
need is not the deviation of output from full capacity, where full
capacity is defined in terms of the maximum output capable of
being produced by existing facilities.Rather we should define
capacity in terms of some "optimum" operating rate—presumably
the point of minimum average unit costs.
When fitting a regression equation of gross profits against devia-
tions in output from capacity, the actual point of utilization which
we choose as "normal" does not matter in terms of goodness of fit.
But, it does affect the constant in the equation, i.e., if we measure
deviations of actual output from a physical maximum capacity,
all deviations will be negative; if we choose some "optimum" level
of utilization as our base line, both positive and negative deviations
will occur.The correlation coefficient and the b coefficients will
not be affected, but the constant in the equation will; i.e., the con-
8Franco Modigliani, "Fluctuations in the Saving-Income Ratio; a Problem in
Economic Forecasting," Studies in Income and Wealth 11, New York, NI3ER,
1949, pp. 403—407.
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stant a in
ck yr =a+ b ; =deviation(in dollars) of corporate(3)
C productfrom capacity
will be higher, the higher the level of utilization from which we
choose to measure our deviations.9If we are to interpret a as the
normal share of profits around which cyclical fluctuations take
place, itis desirable to allow, in the estimating procedure, for
positive as well as negative deviations.
The actual estimation of a capacity series for corporate gross
product involves, of course, much cruder statistical techniques
than is implied in the foregoing discussion.One possible method
is to use a corporate capital stock figure as a measure of changes in
capacity.During the past four decades, however, capital-output
ratios have been declining. A capital stock figure would, there-
fore, underestimate the growth in capacity.What we have done,
in lieu of actual capacity figures, is to define "normal capacity
output" in terms of a trend of actual output fitted to relatively
full employment years only.This allows for positive as well as
negative deviations between actual output and normal capacity
output.Deviations of actual from capacity output were com-
puted annually for the years 1922—41 and quarterly for the postwar
years, 1948—59.Gross corporate product was estimated by adding
corporate depreciation to national income originating in corpora-
tions.The rate of growth in normal full capacity output was
determined in two parts for 1922—41.One trend was fitted to
1922—29.Somewhere in the early thirties, however, there was
clearly a decline in the rate of growth in capacity.Hence, a
separate capacity growth line for the thirties was estimated simply
by taking the growth rate in real corporate product between 1929
and the average of 1940-41.For any single year normal capacity
output was defined to be the prior peak output plus the normal
capacity growth rate.Similar techniques were employed in the
postwar period.As in the case of the prewar period, two trend
rates of growth were used; one from 1948 to 1953, and a second,
lower rate, from 1953 to 1959.10For prewar and postwar periods,
°In his comment, which follows, Bert Hickman correctly points out that the
regression coeflicients areaffectedby the choice of the "optimum" of capacity
utilization.However, as Hickman demonstrates, the slope and elasticity values
are not affected by this choice.
10Actually, the latter period was one of both lower capacity growth rates and
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separately, the following equation was fitted:
(3a)
Inthe postwar period the equation was fitted for the following
subperiods:
1. 1948—1959.
2. 1948—1950 cycle (3Q 1948 to 3Q 1950).
3.1953—1955 cycle (1Q 1953 to 4Q 1955).
4.1957—1959 cycle (1Q 1957to2Q 1959).
5.allcyclestaken together (i.e.,"plateau"periods were
omitted).
Thetime variable in 1922—41 was set to zero in 1929.In the post-
war subperiods the time variable was set to zero at the beginning
of each subperiod.This time variable, of course, has to carry all
of the intricate factors which determine changes in the normal
(i.e., full capacity) profit share.
The results are given in Table 2.The most striking feature of
the regressions is the narrow range of the coefficients for the output
deviation variable.Given the volatility of profits,itisquite
striking that the percentage change in the profit share per 1 per
cent deviation of output from normal was almost the same in
1922—41 as in 1948—59.Considering the fact that we are fitting
ratios, and that the postwar data are quarterly, the correlation
coefficients are quite high.(We could, of course, have obtained
much better fits by using absolute data.)
As one would expect, the postwar fit is noticeably improved
when the various recessions are taken separately.The better fit
of 1922—41 is also to be expected.Because of the great depres-
sion, the variance in actual relative to capacity output was so large
as to swamp those factors affecting the behavior of profits which
are not themselves systematically related to the business cycle.In
the postwar period the smaller variance of output deviations tends
to increase the importance of such factors, leading to a poorer fit.
As we shall note below, the postwar fit is improved when we
introduce some of these factors explicitly into the equations.The
coefficient of estimated for the whole period is lower than
the coefficient estimated for recessions and recoveries alone.In
lower capacity utilization.Hence a straight line was extended from 1953 to the
second quarter of 1959, and the figure for the latter was raised by one per cent
to allow for the less than full employment conditions which prevailed.
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general this reflects the fact that during plateau periods the in-
fluence of output deviations is smaller than during periods in
which output is changing sharply.
The equations in Table 2 can be transformed into the elasticity
and the slope of changes in profits relative to deviations from
normal in corporate product; i.e., the proportion of changes in
TABLE 2
REGRESSION EQUATIONS OF GROSS PROFIT AGAINST
DEVIATIONS OF OUTPUT FROM































aThe equation fitted was= a + + c(S).
and areexpressed in percentage terms.
grosscorporate income from normal that are absorbed by changes






=theabsolute deviation in corporate gross product from
normal
the elasticity of the change in profits with respect to
corporate output deviations.
Table 3 gives the values of the slopes and elasticities for the various
periods.The ratio of the change in gross profits to the change in
corporate gross product from normal is remarkably constant in
all the periods under consideration. A drop in corporate product









1922—41 .474 1.70 .279
1948—59









1957—59 cycle .484 1.78 .272
cycles only .487 1.70 .287
below normal of, say $10 billion, leads to a decline in gross profits
of $4.7 to $5.0 billion, assuming that we start from a situation in
which actual and normal product are equal.Given the normal
profits/income ratios which have existed during the period, the
implied elasticity ranges between 1.7and1.9.
Notethat the marginal ratio of changes in profits to deviations
in corporate product from normal is substantially larger than the
secular, full capacity ratio of profits to gross product.Measured
from normal capacity, declines in income lead to more than propor-
tional declines in profits by a factor of almost two.
The slopes and elasticities calculated in Table 3 refer to the
relationship between profit changes and deviations in corporate
product from its normal full capacity level.But we are interested
in the change in profits relative to the actual change in output; i.e.,
to determine the change in disposable income per unit change in
GNP, we need the change in profits per unit change in GNP, not
the change in profits per unit deviation of GNP from the normal.
In other words, as one stage in this process, we must convert
into This conversion can be made, once we
specify the rate at which normal gross product is growing relative
to the actual gross product.Equation (4) gives us
=a+b.
ck
Fromthis we can deduce that,
—+b11 —a
r(l + —j) (6)
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where the term Yck(t—j) —j) representsthe initial ratio
between normal and actual gross product, and
q =therate of change in "normal" gross product
r= therate of change in actual corporate gross product
j= thenumber of periods over which the change in product
extends.
Given the values of a and b from the regression equations, we can
calculate the marginal rate of change in profits relative to the
change in corporate product.The results for a.29, b =.20,
and q =.01per quarter (roughly the postwar values), are given
in Table 4.Note that the slopes change slightly as the period is
lengthened.Thisresultsfromthecompounding effectsof
(1 + q)(1 + r)as jisextended.Unless risa very large
figure, however, this effect will be relatively insignificant.
Strikingly, the constant ratio between changes in gross profits
and changes in corporate gross product from normal is converted
into a nonlinear relationship when we measure the ratio between
changes in gross profits and changes in actual corporate gross
product.The verbal explanation for this is quite simple, and,
when once elaborated, intuitively obvious.Granted that the ratio
of profits to corporate gross product depends on the degree of
excess capacity, the profit ratio will decline if capacity rises while
output remains unchanged.(The function which determines
isobviously undefined when =r = 0.)Now
imagine that output falls very gradually, and capacity is still rising.
The decline in profits relative to the decline in output will be very
large; profits would be declining even if output remained un-
changed.The faster the fall in output, the closer is to
and the closer approaches
Asmay be seen in Table 4, when the rate of growth in actual
income equals the rate of growth in capacity, the average and
marginal profit ratios are the same—the share of profits is constant,
except for the time trend, which we are ignoring here.Also,
when output rises by less than the growth in capacity, the profit
share falls, and the marginal profit ratio is less than the average.
Indeed, if output rises very slowly, the absolute level of profits
may decline, i.e., < 0.
The share of declines in total income absorbed by corporate
profits tends to be quite large, but this absorption rate decreases
the faster the rate of decline in income.Insofar as the ratio of
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TABLE 4














































Calculations assume =1'.in initial period, and that a =.29,b =.20,
q =.01per quarter.
changes in disposable income to changes in GNPisaffected by the
behavior of corporate profits, the marginal ratio of disposable in-
come to GNP will be quite small for moderate rates of decrease in
GNP. The greater the rate of decline in GNP, however, the less
will be the absorption of that decline by corporate profits, and the
greater the absorption by disposable income.While this point
has important implications for multiplier theory, it should not be
overrated.The rate of decline in output during moderate reces-
sions is not so very different from the rate of decline during larger
recessions.It is the duration of contraction, not so much the rate
of decline, which differentiates recessions of varying severity.
Ourconclusionsso far relate only to the behavior of gross
profits relative to gross corporate product; to relate profits to total
gross national product we must examine the share of corporate
product in total product.
The Share of Gross Corporate Product
The corporate form of organization is much more prevalent in
some industries than in others.In manufacturing, for example,
corporate product accounts for an overwhelming proportion of
total product.In services and trade, on the other hand, the pro-
portion is much smaller.Hence, apart from long-run trends in
the share of corporate product in individual sectors, the share of
corporate product in total gross national product will depend on
the industrial composition of output.As that composition shifts
toward those sectors in which corporations account for the bulk
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of activity, the corporate share in total GNP will rise; and vice
versa.
If the industrial distribution of GNPwererandom with respect
to cyclical variation, the corporate share of GNP could only be
determined by a specific examination of the nature of each cycle.
However, there is good a priori reason—and as we shall see
abundant empirical evidence—to support the hypothesis that there
are systematic cyclical changes in industrial composition, which,
in turn, have a systematic effect on the share of corporate product.
More specifically, value added in commodity-producing industries
fluctuates much more sharply than value added in service or distri-
bution industries.The former are mainly organized in the cor-
porate form; the latter much less so.Consequently, as output falls
below capacity, the proportion of output originating in the cor-
porate sector tends to decline; the opposite occurs as output rises
relative to capacity.
To test this hypothesis we write:
(7)
where = (1'—Yk),the deviation in real private nonfarm
product from "normal." We have estimated normal gross product
by the same techniques as those used to estimate normal corporate
product.The results of fitting equation (7) to the data are sum-
marized in Table 5.
Table 6 shows the results of converting the coefficients of the
regression equation into the slope and elasticity coefficients,
and /..Wc.Using exactly the same procedure as outlined earlier for
finding wecan calculate given the a and b values
of the regression equations and the rate of growth in capacity
GNP. As in the case of the profit-corporate product relationship,
the marginal ratio of the change in corporate product to the change
in total product tends to become smaller as the rate of decline in
GNP becomes larger.Since = the
marginal ratio of the change in profits to the change in GNP de-
clines very rapidly with an increase in the rate of decline of GNP
(orwith an increase in the excess of the rate of growth in GNP
overits normal capacity growth rate).
There is a crucial difference, however, between the results of
the corporate product share regression (Table 5) and the corporate
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profitsshareregression (Table 2).In the case of profits, we
found that the regression coefficients (and consequently the slope
and elasticity coefficients) were fairly uniform over a number of
cycles widely varying in duration and amplitude.In the case of
the corporate product share, however, the coefficient relating that
share to deviations in GNPfromnormal differs from cycle to
cycle.More importantly, the coefficient seems to be smaller, the
larger the amplitude of cyclical fluctuation.The values of b in





The reason for this is quite probably that we have attempted to
capture a nonlinear phenomenon with a linear function."In other
words the relative magnitude of the decline in the corporate
product share when GNP declines below normal is itself a decreas-
TABLE 5
REGRESSION EQUATIONS: SHARE OF CORPORATE PRODUCT
RELATED TO CHANGES IN GNP
































NOTE: and are expressed in percentages.The regression equation fitted
was: a + c(t).
111tshould be stressed that the corporate product share is now beingrelatedto
deviationsof actual fromnormalGNP.The nonlinearity involved enters at this
stage.Itisclear,from theearlierdiscussionthatthelinearrelationship
= converts to a nonlinear relationship when we measure
as a function of
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TABLE 6







1922—41 .679 1.23 .551
1948—50
whole period .811 1.42 .571
1948—50 cycle .978 1.68 .581
1953—55 cycle .764 1.32 .580
1957—59 cycle .749 1.28 .585
cycles only .793 1.39 .572
ing function of the magnitude of the GNPdeviation.As a con-
sequence, the 1922—41 period, which is dominated by the huge
fluctuations in output during the 1930's, exhibits a lower b coef-
ficient than any of the postwar cycles.On the other hand, the
1948—50 fluctuation in nonfarm product was much smaller than
the other cycles; hence the b coefficient is quite large.
If the relationship is really nonlinear, then
will decrease as LtYk increases.In that case the calcula-
tions of in Table 7 understate the degree to which
decreases as the (absolute) rate of change in increases.Table
7 shows that falls with r', assuming a constant
for declines of all magnitudes.However, if itselfde-
creases with an increase in clearly will fall even more
than shown in Table 7, as the size ofincreases.
If we go back to the basic hypothesis upon which the relation-
ship of the corporate product share to deviations in GNPwas
founded, it is not hard to discover the reason for the nonlinear
shape of the relationship.As total output falls below normal
capacity levels, output and income in those industries in which the
corporate form of organization is most important tends to decline
more than proportionately.In a mild recession almost all of the
decline in activity is centered in the commodity-producing sectors
of the economy.Indeed, declines in inventory investment alone
account for a major part of the total fall-off in activity.As the
recession deepens, however, the downturn begins to extend into
other areas, particularly trade and services.As a consequence, the
marginal ratio of the decline in corporate product to the deviation
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TABLE 7
VALUES OF FOR Veuuous VALUES OF








NOTE: Calculations assume YkYin initial period.
aGivena =.580,b =.17, q'=.01per quarter.
in GNP from normal becomes smaller the further the downturn
proceeds.
A direct comparison of deviations in GNP with changes in the
share of output represented by services and by (nonfarm) com-
modity production strengthens the preceding hypothesis.Table
8 summarizes the results of regressions relating the share of com-
modities and of services in GNP to the deviation in GNP from
normal.The table shows the slope and elasticity coefficients,
derived from the regressions:
=+b1
ic+ci(t) (whereandare the shares
s ofcommodity and service
= a2 +b2+c2(t) productionin total non-
farm private GNP).
The last column in the table gives the multiple regression coef-
ficients of the original regressions upon which the slope and
elasticity coefficients were based.
In the 1922—41 period, the elasticity of commodity production
relative to GNPdeviationswas much smaller than in the postwar
cycles.The converse holds true for the elasticity of service
production.It is possible, of course, that the difference in elas-
ticity between prewar and postwar is due to a change in economic
structure, making the commodity production share more sensitive
and the service production share less sensitive to GNP deviations,
relative to their prewar sensitivities.Since there have been no
postwar cyclical declines approaching the magnitude of the 1937—
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38 downturn, much less the 1929—3 3 debacle, there is no way of
testing this.On balance, I do not believe we can attribute the
changed elasticities to structural differences.The logic of the
case for a nonlinear relationship, however, is quite strong.In
moderate recessions service production does not fall significantly,
if at all.The same is true of activity in the distributive sector.
On the other hand, when the decline in economic activity begins
to reach depression proportions, output and income in these sectors
do begin to fall significantly, with a corresponding reduction in
the proportion of the output decline absorbed by commodity
production.
TABLE 8
REGRESSION RELATING SHARE OF COMMODITIES AND SERVICES IN GNP
TO DEVIATION IN GNP: SLOPE AND ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS
Period
Commodity Production Service Production





































NOTE: The regressions for each individual postwar cycle were run without the time
variable.
If we combine the behavioral relationships described in the last
few pages we reach the following conclusions:
1. When total nonfarm private GNP(= GNI)declines, the pro-
portion of the declines absorbed by gross corporate profits is
much larger than the average long-run ratio of profits to income.
2. In mild recessions, this marginal ratio of profit change to GNP
change is very large relative to the average ratio.The ratio
tends to decline as the rateofdecline in GNP increases:it
remains, however, above the average long-run ratio of profits to
income.12
12 From equation (6),itisclear that approaches the value (a + b)
asymptoticallyas the rate of decline in Ycapproaches infinity.In other words,
theslope becomesa closer and closer approximation to the slope
[= (a + b)]as the rate of change in increases.Since aisthe
averageratio of gross profits to gross income, the marginal ratio always remains
above the average ratio, whenever Y0 is absolutely declining.
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3. The ratio of corporate profit change to income change tends to
become smaller as the magnitude of the decline in GNP in-
creases.This phenomenon is due to the fact that initial de-
clines in GNP are borne almost exclusively by sectors in which
the corporate form is dominant, in particular the commodity
producing sectors; as the economic decline continues, however,
it tends to extend beyond these sectors into those where the
corporate form is less The marginal ratio of the
change in corporate product to the change in GNP, however,
still remains larger than the average ratio between the two
magnitudes.
Even under the assumption that corporate dividends fell propor-
tionately with corporate gross profits (which they do not), the
recession shift from profits to other forms of income would be
stabilizing in terms of consumption outlays.The marginal ratio
of corporate taxes plus corporate saving to gross corporate profits
(even granted the dividend-proportionality assumption) is much
higher than the marginal ratio of personal taxes plus personal sav-
ing to personal income.In other words, a very large proportion
of the decline in gross corporate profits is absorbed by decreases
in government revenues and saving; a much smaller proportion of
declines in personal income is absorbed by savings and govern-
ment revenues.The fact that the marginal ratio of gross corpo-
rate profits to gross national product is much higher than the
average ratio between these two variables, implies that the mar-
ginal ratio of disposable income, and hence of consumption, to
gross national income is much smaller than the average ratio.
Indeed, since it is the deviation in GNP from normal capacity
levels which controls this relationship, a very small decline in GNP
may be fully absorbed in profits, with no aggregate decline in
other forms of income.However, this stabilizing influence tends
to become weaker—though it does not disappear—as the rate and
magnitude of the downturn become larger.In other words, quite
Infittinga corporate profit function for postwar cycles, Duesenberry,
Eckstein, and Fromm ("Simulation of the United States Economy") find that
splitting GNP into final saks and inventory investment substantially improves the
results. The reason for this is probably that the proportion of GNP accounted
for by corporate gross product is significantly related to the level of inventory
investment. The tendency of the commodity output share of GNP to vary in-
versely and the service output share to vary directly with cyclical changes in
output, is partly accounted for by the very large values for changes in inventory
investment which characterize cyclical movements in GNP.
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apart from the stabilizing features of our tax and transfer payment
system, and of Duesenberry and Friedman consumption functions,
consumption outlays are well insulated against moderate shocks
to the economy.Larger initial shocks, however, carry with theni
not onlylarger,but proportionatelylarger,impacts.Quite
crudely expressed, the multiplier has a very low value for small
changes in nonconsumption spending; its value tends to increase,
however, as the recession worsens.The multiplier is, in a word,
nonlinear, depending directly on the magnitude of the change
in GNP.
Thehypothesis that the share of corporate profits in corporate
income originating and the share of the latter in nonfarm private
GNP depend on deviations in GNPfroma normal capacity level,
can explain a number of additional aspects of the cyclical behavior
of corporate profits.
Both Lintner'4 and have noted that the change in
profits, relative to the change in income, is larger during the down-
swing of the cycle than during the upswing.This asymetrical
behavior is predicted by our hypothesis.If and Yc/Y both
deviate from normal as GNPdeviatesfrom normal, then the mar-
ginal ratio, willbe larger during a downturn than during
an upturn which exhibits the same rate of change.If, for exam-
ple, GNP declines at a rate of 2 per cent per quarter, the rate at
which it is deviating from a growing capacity will be larger than
2 per cent.On the other hand, a recovery of 2 per cent per
quarter will imply that the reduction in the deviation from normal
is proceeding at less than 2 per cent per quarter.As a conse-
quence, the decline in the profit share is more rapid during a down-
turn than the increase in the profit share during a recovery of
corresponding speed.In terms of marginal ratios, will be
larger during the downturn than during the recovery.Suppose
GNP falls 10 per cent in four quarters.If capacity is growing
at1 per cent per quarter, the deviation of GNPfromnormal
would be 14 per cent at the end of the year, and the profit share
would fall by an amount governed by this deviation. A 10 per
cent rate of increase in GNPfromthe trough (with the increase
measured as a percentage of the same base on which the decrease
was measured) would still leave GNP approximately 8 per cent
t4Linmer, "Distribution of Incomes."
Hickman, Growth and Stability.
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below normal at the end of the year.Even though GNP had
attained its prior peak level, profits would be lower than at prior
peak, because of the growth in capacity.Hence during
the recovery would have been less than the during the
preceding downturn, even though the magnitude and rate of GNP
change were the same in both phases.
There is another reason why the change in profits relative to the
change in GNP is cyclically asymmetrical. A typical upturn,
measured from trough to peak, normally encompasses two sub-
phases: first a recovery of GNP to normal, and then a period of
slower growth after normal capacity utilization is approached or
surpassed.In the early, pure recovery, phase of the upturn the
ratio will be larger than the normal secular ratio of profits
to income, although less than the which characterized the
downturn.During the next phase of the cycle, since GNP usu-
ally rises no faster (and often slower) than capacity, will
be much lower, somewhere in the neighborhood of (and often
below) the normal secular ir/Yratio.A calculation of
from trough to peak will yield a weighted average of the separate
ratios for the two phases, and should be significantly lower than
the marginal ratio which characterized the downturn.
In many cycles the growth in GNP during the latter stages of
the upturn is slower than the growth in capacity.As a conse-
quence, the share of profits in GNP will tend to decline moder-
ately before the cycle peak is reached.Osborne and Epstein16 in
an analysis of the corporate profit share since World War I, found
that this was a typical pattern; the peak ratio of profits to GNP
was attained before the cycle peak was reached.Our hypothesis
tends to predict such behavior.
Hickman'7 has observed that, on an annual basis, consumption
outlays continued to rise during the mild recessions of 1924 and
1927.Part of this may indeed be due to a Friedman type distrib-
uted lag in the consumption function.However, the hypothesis
that the profit share falls when GNP declines below capacity,
would also help to explain this phenomenon.Granted a Lintner-
type function for dividends,18 a decline in the profit share implies
Harlowe Osborne and Joseph Epstein, "Corporate Profits Since World War
II," Survey of Current Business, January 1956.
Hickman, Growth and Stability.
Even with a constant ratio of dividends to payout, a shift in the profit share
would raise the disposable income share, unless the combined share of retained
profits and corporate taxes in total profits were no higher than the effective rate
of taxation on personal income.
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a rise in the disposable income share.In the annual data, 1924
and 1927 show up as little more than a cessation of growth.But
this was enough to create a rise in excess capacity and a fall in the
profit share.Disposable income continued to rise, and so did
consumption.
RETAINED CORPORATE PROFITS
The impact on disposable income of a change in the profit share
will depend, of course, on the dividend policy of corporate man-
agement.Even if dividend payment ratios remain unchanged—
i.e.,dividends change proportionately with after-tax profits—a
decline in the corporate profit share would raise the share of dis-
posable income.At the present time dividends account for about
20 per cent, on the average, of total gross corporate profits.
(They represent, of course, a much higher proportion—about 55
per cent—of net profits after tax.)If this proportion were main-
tained, each $1 billion shift in income away from gross profits
would result in an increase of $0.8 billion in personal income, and
a somewhat smaller increase in disposable income, depending on
the marginal effective tax rate on dividend recipients and on other
income recipients. A simple algebraic model will illustrate these
relations.(It should be remembered that we are making the
drastic assumption that dividends change proportionately with
gross profits.)Assume a decline in corporate gross profits, air,





=marginaleffective personal tax rate on incomes other
than dividends
t'= marginaleffective tax rate on dividend income.
Then =&(.8—t +.2t')
In order that be zero, when there is a shift in income between
gross profits and other types of income, we must have,
t =.8+ .2t'
Even if the marginal effective tax rate on dividends were as low as
20 per cent, the marginal effective rate on other forms of income
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would have to be .85 per cent in order to cancel out the effect of
a shift in income distribution.As a matter of fact, the value of t
is probably between 15 and 20 per cent.With a marginal effec-
tive tax rate on dividends of, say 40 per cent, a shift of $1 billion
of income away from gross profits to order forms of income would
raise disposable income by about $0.7 billion.In other words,
the "sticky" behavior of dividends is not a necessary condition in
order for a shift away from corporate profits to raise disposable
income.The very high average proportion of gross corporate
profits accounted for by depreciation, taxes, and retained earnings
is sufficient to explain the phenomenon.Itis gross corporate
profits which are relevant, in the short run at least.Changes in
depreciation simply reallocate a gross flow between two account-
ing categories, net profits and depreciation.Further, whatever
one believes about the incidence of a change in corporate tax
rates, surely a short-run change in corporate tax liabilities, brought
about by a change in profits, does not affect the gross margin.
The relatively high tax rates simply mean that government reve-
nues absorb a large part of any change in gross profits.
Once we take into account the fact that dividends are "sticky,"
the impact on disposable income of a change in gross corporate
profits is increased.Lintner's work in this area is too well known
to require detailed repetition.Using annual data for 1918—41,
Lintner19found dividends (Di) to be a function of current profits
before IVA and after taxes (Pr), and a lagged dividend variable
(Dt-i);
.352'+ .700Th_1R =.967
Duesenberry,Eckstein, and Fromm2° fitted the same equation
to quarterly data for 1947—5 7 and found,
=— .53+ + R =.962
As they point out, the increased size of the lagged dividend co-
efficient and the reduced size of the current profits coefficient are
to be expected when shifting from an annual to a quarterly basis.
In both cases, however, the coefficient of current profits is very
low compared to the coefficient of lagged dividends. A decline in
profits has a very damped impact on dividends, and a very dispro-
portionate effect on retained earnings.
Lintner, "Distribution of Incomes," in AER, May 1956.
In "Simulation of the United States Economy," Econometrica, October 1960.
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The Lintner dividend equation is approximately equivalent to
making dividends a function of a weighted moving average of past
profits, with the current term of the moving average receiving
rather small weight (particularly in the quarterly series).Con-
sider a situation in which profits have been rising before a turning
point.During the early stages of the downturn dividends may
not decline at all, indeed they may rise slightly, if the decline is
shallow.2'The further profits decline, however, the larger will
be the effect of further declines on dividends.If profits stabilize
at a lower level, dividends, and hence disposable income, will con-
tinue to decline for a while.
We pointed out earlier, that the nature of our gross profits hy-
pothesis implied that gross profits absorbed a very large part of
declines in income.The hypothesis also implies, however, that
the proportion absorbed by profits tends to fall as the rate and
magnitude of the economic decline become larger.Corporate
dividend policy, as described by Lintner's equations, magnifies
the impact of this pattern of profit behavior on disposable income.
In mild and short-lived recessions, not only do gross profits absorb
a very sizeable proportion of the decline in disposable income,
but in turn, most if not all of the gross profit decline is absorbed
by corporate taxes and retained earnings; the reduction in divi-
dends will be very small, or nonexistent.The faster and the fur-
ther the decline in income, however, the smaller the marginal
ratio, Similarly,the steeper and longer the decline in
profits, the greater the impact on dividends, as the moving average
of profits (on which dividends depend) begins to fall rapidly.
Thus, the stabilizing effect of changes in income distribution
away from profits and toward other forms of income is very
powerful.Small shocks to the economy encounter a powerful
built-in stabilizer—quite apart from Federal budget stabilizers.22
The marginal rate of change of disposable income relative to GNP
changes is quite small.But an increase in the size of the initial
shock has a more than proportional effect on the economy. The
is,the new terms in the moving average, while below their immediate
predecessors, may still exceed the terms in the distant past which are being
dropped.
22 factthat corporate taxes take such a large part of corporate profits does
affect the average and marginal behavior of dividends.Hence, indirectly, part
of the stabilizing effectiveness of shifts in the corporate profits share can be traced
to the structure of tax rates.See below, p. 167.
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ratio of changes in disposable income relative to changes in GNP
becomeslarger, as the rate, magnitude, and duration of the down-
turn increase.Hence, the larger the shock to the economy, the
proportionally greater the cumulative secondary effects are likely
to be, at least insofar as the stabilizing role of profits is concerned.
TABLE 9
GROSS PROFIT, RETAINED PROFIT, AND OTHER RA'rros,
IN VARIOUS RECESSIONS
Marginal Ratios Average Ratios
.













1929—33 .50.69 .35 .74 .26 .29.55.60.09
4Q 1948-2Q1949.561.44 .82 .92 .76 .29.58.81.14
2Q1953-1Q1954.58 .86 .50 .96 .48 .28.58.82.13
3Q 1957-IQ1958.56 .84 .47 .97 .46 .27.58 .81.12
NOTE: Data were deflated by the private nonfarm GNP deflator before the changes
were calculated (see below, pp. 36—37).Average ratios were calculated for the peak
year or quarter.Private nonfarm product was measured on the income side of the
accounts, i.e., GNP minus statistical discrepancy, since we wish to measure changes in
profits against changes in total gross income.(See Appendix 2.)
Table 9 gives some of the more important average and mar-
ginal ratios for the 1929—33 depression and for each of the post-
war recessions.The ratios behave more or less as our hypotheses
would indicate.The marginal ratios between changes in profits
and changes in corporate product, between the latter and changes
in GNP, and between changes in retained gross profits and changes
in GNP were substantially larger than the average ratios.In the
1929—33 downturn, gross retained profits, which in 1929 accounted
for only 9 per cent of GNP, absorbed 26 per cent of the decline
in GNP.In the 1957—58 recession, gross retained profits absorbed
47 per cent of the fall in GNP, although they were only 12 per
cent of GNP in 1957.
Theratio of the change in gross profits to the change in cor-
porate product was slightly higher in the postwar cycles than in
1929—3 3.In the formulation presentedearlier,this marginal
ratio should be larger, the smaller the rate of decline in GNP.In
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the postwar cycles, the rate of decline in GNP was smaller, but
not much smaller, than in 1929—3 3; the major difference was in the
magnitude, not in the speed of the decline.
The second ratio, the change in corporate product relative to
the change in GNP, depends both on the rate and the magnitude
of the decline in GNP. This shows up particularly in the figure
for 1949.The percentage decline in private nonfarm GNP during
that downturn was only 2.5 per cent, compared to 4.5 per cent
in 1954 and 5.5 per cent in 1958.23On the other hand, the much
greater magnitude of the 1929—33 downturn was associated with
a ratio only moderately smaller than in 1953—54 and
1957—58.Insofar as these few recessions can be taken as evidence,
it may be that the marginal ratio between corporate product and
GNP falls most rapidly for small increases in the magnitude of the
GNP decline and then falls at a reduced rate as the magnitude of
the downturn is further increased.24
As the Lintner equations imply, the marginal ratio between re-
tained earnings and profits was much lower in the deep depression
of 1929—33 than in the shallower and shorter recessions of the post-
war period.Only a small part of the dividend decline took place
in the first year of the 1929 downturn; most of it occurred in sub-
sequent years, as the moving average of profits began to decline
sharply.An additional reason for the larger relative decline in
dividends in the 1929—3 3 period lies in the fact that at that time
they comprised a larger fraction of gross profits.The substantial
increase in corporate profits taxes since the 1920's did not result
in a significant rise in gross before-tax profit margins.Not only
were after-tax margins reduced, but most of the reduction took
place at the expense of dividends; retained earnings as a percentage
of before-tax profits did not decline very much.Hence, our con-
cept of gross retained earnings (corporate profits before taxes plus
depreciation minus dividends) is currently a much larger propor-
tion of total gross profits than in 1929.25
The final marginal ratio in Table 9, wassignificantly
The relative magnitude of the 1949 decline is much larger than 2.5 per cent
when total GNP is used as a measure; the magnitude of the 1949 decline in private
nonfarm GNP is significantly smaller than the decline in total GNP.
For a further discussion of the factors affecting the corporate product share
in GNP, see below, pp. 171 if.
25 ratiowas .60 in 1929 and .80 in 1957.
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higher in each downturn than its average value at the peak.How-
ever, gross retained corporate earnings accounted for about one-
half of the decline in total nonfarm income in the last two reces-
sions, compared to about one-quarter in 1929—33.In both the
1929—3 3 and the postwar downturns corporate profits acted as a
stabilizing influence, but much more so in the postwar cycles.
While some of this difference is due to a change in economic struc-
ture (particularly to the smaller average ratio of dividends to gross
retained earnings which characterized the postwar period), our
basic hypothesis implies that a good part of the difference is simply
due to the greater magnitude and duration of the decline in income
in 1929—33.
RATIOS OF DEFLATED VERSUS CURRENT DOLLAR FIGURES
All of our marginal ratios have been based on the assumption that
deviations in. the share of profits in corporate product (and of
corporate product in GNP) are a function of deviations in real
output from normal capacity levels.The theoretical basis for
this relationship is the hypothesis that the two major factors af-
fecting the profit share—changes in unit costs and the markup
on costs—are themselves systematically related to the degree of
excess capacity.Thus, two recessions with the same deviation
of real product from normal capacity output would, in our formu-
lation, be characterized by the same decline in the profit share,
even though the absolute level of prices fell more in one recession
than the other.The excess capacity variableis supposed to
"carry" any shift in the price-cost margin.Hence, if the devia-
tion in GNP from normal, and therefore the deviation of profits
from normal, were the same in two recessions, the ratio
would be the same, but only if and were measured in con-
stant dollars, with both terms deflated by the same deflator.
When the marginal ratio of profits to corporate product is meas-
ured in current dollars, a given decline in the share of profits will
require a larger the smaller the price decrease. A simple
example may help make this clear:
Let=corporateproduct in constant dollars
Ye= corporateproduct in current dollars
IT= corporateprofits in constant dollars
z =corporateprofits in current dollars
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When real income declines by 20 per cent, the profit share
Z/yc(= declines to .08.if the level of prices remains un-
















In our formulation the deviation in real output from normal car-
ries with it the impact on profits of any change in relative prices
(i.e., prices relative to wages).The degree of absolute price
flexibility plays no independent role, except that of numeraire.
The profit share is determined without reference to the absolute
price level.But for the profit share to fall to a lower level,
the marginal ratio of the profit decline to the product decline must
be higher than the average profit share.In order to reach any
given level, the marginal must exceed the average by an amount
which depends on the size of the decline in product.If real
product falls, say, 20 per cent below capacity, the share of profits
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in product will fall by a certain amount.But if prices decline,
the magnitude of the current dollar decline in product will, of
course, be larger than the magnitude of the constant dollar de-
cline.Hence, the marginal ratio of profit change to product
change will be smaller when both changes are measured in current
dollars than when they are both measured in constant dollars.
There is a determinate relation between the ratios and
Giventheequationdeterminingtheprofitshare,
=a+ we can obtain the marginal ratio
Assume, also, for the sake of simplicity that there is no growth in
capacity, and that Yc in the initial period.
Let




— (1 +p)' —(1 +p)
For any particular there will result a particular profit












And since r'= r+ p + pr, where r =
pa—+b 11 q
—r+p+pr
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When p =0,q =b.When r is negative, b > a; hence, during a
recession, q < b when prices decline and q> b should prices in-
crease.
The same formulation can be made for the relation between
and If one computes the marginal ratios with un-
deflated data, the 1929—3 3 ratios are very much smaller than the
postwar ratios.But this is a spurious result.Prices fell sub-
stantially in 1929—3 3, but, aside from 1949, they did not decline
in the postwar recessions.The further prices fall, the smaller
the marginal ratios must be in order to reduce the average ratio
by a given amount.Conversely, the marginal ratio of unde-
flated disposable income to GNPandthe marginal ratio of con-
sumption to GNP fell far more in 1929—33 than in postwar cycles,
if we base the ratios on undeflated data.
The marginal profit ratios in Table 9 were calculated from de-
flated data, in order to avoid the purely formal, arithmetical ef-
fect of changes in prices on the ratios.Even after correction the
1929—3 3 ratios were smaller than the postwar ones.These dif-
ferences are "legitimate" and reflect a real difference in behavior;
the much wider divergence in undeflated ratios does not.
To use the marginal ratios developed in the earlier part of this
paper for prediction, where prediction in current dollar terms is
desired, it would be necessary to convert the ratios to current
dollar terms by use of equation 11.
OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE
CORPORATE PRODUCT SHARE
So far we have concentrated on the behavior of corporate product
and corporate profits as determined by deviations in output from
normal.Insofar as the structural relationships which determine
the profit share are themselves imperfectly correlated with the de-
viation of output from normal, we should expect to get a better
fit by directly relating the profit share and the corporate product
share to these structural factors.
The basic rationale for expecting a systematic deviation in the
corporate product share as total private nonfarm output deviates
from normal lies in the fact that there are systematic cyclical shifts
in the industrial composition of output.However, the change
in industrial output mix is not perfectly correlated with output
deviations.While the general direction and magnitude of shifts in
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industrial composition will be the same in most cycles, each cycle
will have its own distinctive characteristics.As a consequence, if
we add to our earlier equation, =a+ b (AYk/Y) + c (t),
a specific allowance for mix changes, we should expect to find a
significant improvement in the lit if the change in mix varies sub-
stantially from cycle to cycle.To examine the possibility we fit:
=a+ b + c(t) + d
(Corn)+ e +f(c0;st)
Corn Ser Const
(where, -y,and equal,respectively, the shares of
commodity, service, and construction output in total private
nonfarm product).
The results are shown in Table 10.In 1922—41 and in each of
the separate postwar cycles the mix added significant additional
information to that given by the time trend and the output devia-
tion.There is already a high intercorrelation between the mix and
the output deviation.This is the reason we get generally good re-
suits from fitting the corporate share to output deviations.How-
ever, in each single postwar cycle, and in the 1922—41 period the
variation in mix, over and above the systematic cyclical variation,
is sufficient to yield significant partial correlations for the mix.
TABLE 10
CORPORATE PRODUCT SHARE RELATED TO OUTPUT DEVIATION
AND OUTPUT COMPOSITION
Period R1.23a R1.234i6a R1456.23a
1922—41 .959 .989 .869 .958
1948—59 .775 .833 .290 .806
1948—50 .941 .992 .935 —
1953—55 .892 .957 .785 —
1957—59 .984 .989 .620 —
All cycles .860 .886 .435 .859
Plateaus .160 .650 .637 .452
SR1.23multip'e correlation coefficient ofon —i— and (t).
Yc
R1.23456 =multiplecorrelation coefficient on (t)and mix.
R1456.23 =partialcorrelation coefficient mix, holding and (0 constant.
R1.3456 =multiplecorrelation coefficient ofon (t) and mix.
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For the postwar period as a whole, and for the postwar cycles com-
bined, however, the addition of mix variables adds little to the
correlation.This is probably due to excessive aggregation in
our mix variables.lAThen mix changes are very large,as in
1922-41, or are measured over one cycle only, the intragroup
mix is small compared to the intergroup mix.Had we fitted a
more detailed mix pattern we probably would have achieved better
results.On the other hand, the mix categories we chose—com-
modities, construction, and services—are particularly well suited
for use in an aggregative forecasting model.
As might be expected, the correlation between Yc/Y and
was very poor during plateau periods (the periods between the
end of recovery and the next cycle peak).During such periods
the relationship between and mix is likely to be minimal,
with the mix governed by other than cyclical factors.Even
adding mix as a separate variable does not give us a very good fit,
again because during such periods changes in intergroup mix are
likely to be small compared to intragroup mix.
Insofar as the mix of nonfarm private GNP is not systematically
cyclical in nature—and there is no reason to expect each cycle
to be exactly alike with respect to mix—then the change in
can vary from cycle to cycle.If we wish to be perfectionists
in forecasting (whichdepends on then we must
specify the particular shifts in the composition of output.Since
the multiplier is affected by variations in itis in part de-
pendent on the composition of output.To take account of such
variations in aggregate models is, however, a counsel of per-
fection, particularly since so much of the variance in can be
satisfactorily explained by deviations in output from normal.In
other words, there is enough constancy in the cyclical variation in
output composition to permit the use of as a proxy variable
for variations in mix.
From the regression weights yielded by fitting to the com-
position of output we can derive a set of coefficients which give
the change in the corporate product for any given change in mix.
These are shown in Table 11.For a 1 per cent shift in the com-
position of private nonfarm output from commodities to services,
for example, a decrease of .8 per cent in the share of corporate
product was to be expected in both periods.These percentages,
reflecting the relative weight of the corporate form of organization
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TABLE 11
CHANGE IN THE CORPORATE PRODUCT SHARE FOR SPECIFIED
CHANGES IN OUTPUT COMPOSITION
Period 1 per centchange from:


























SOURCE: Derived from the coefficients of the multiple regression equation:
ICom\ I Ser\ I Constr\)+C(t)
in the various sectors, were (as would be expected) about the
same in both periods.Despite the fact that the coefficients were
so similar in both the prewar and postwar periods, however, their
standard errors were larger than the coefficients themselves in all
cases.The large standard errors stem from the fact that the
three composition variables, expressed as a share of private non-
farm product, add to unity in each observation time period.Thus
each composition variable has a perfect negative correlation with
the sum of the other two.
Other Income Shares
Table 12givesthe results of estimating other major income shares
with the same type of regression as utilized in explaining the
corporate profit share.
There are two features of Table 12 which deserve particular
comment.During the 1922-41 period a negative output deviation
was accompanied by a negative change in the share of unincorpo-
rated business income.The opposite, however, held true in the
postwar period.The reason for this probably lies in the lack
of proper specification of the model.As we stressed earlier, the
incidence of moderate declines in output is almost wholly in the
corporate sector.Consequently, the absolute level of unincor-
porated output originating falls little, if at all.Even if there is
some squeeze in the margins of unincorporated business, so that
its share of income originating in its own sector decreases, the rise
in the share of the unincorporated sector more than offsets the
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TABLE 12
RESULTS OF REGRESSION EQUATIONS ON OTHER MAJOR INCOME
Period R
1922—41
Unincorporated business and 10.2 .042 .023 .903
professional income (.005) (.020)
Property incomeb 12.6 —.046
(.008) (.046)
.946






Unincorporated business and 10.4 — .052 — .053 .954
professional income (.003) (.010)










a Alldata refer to the private nonfarm sector.Shares and output deviations are
expressed in percentage terms.Shared =+
bRent and interest.
°Thetime variable has a value of 0 for all years prior to 1930.
fall in the internal profit share.Further, a large part of the "unin-
corporated business and professional income" is really wages, and
hence the pure profit element is much smaller than the statistical
share would indicate.For these reasons, a moderate decline in
output will raise the statistically reported unincorporated business
income share.Declines in total output of depression magnitude,
however, will be accompanied by a decline in the absolute level
of output in the noncorporate sector.After a point, the fall in
the internal share of unincorporated business profits more than off-
sets the rise in the share of unincorporated business output.Fur-
ther, the marginal ratio of the change in unincorporated output
to the change in total output tends to rise as the output decline
becomes larger.(This is the converse of the nonlinearity in the
corporate product share, which we observed earlier.)As a con-
sequence, in the 192 2—41 regression, which is dominated by the
great depression, the share of business income varies directly with
the deviation in total output; in the postwar regression on the
other hand, it varies inversely with output deviations.
In theory, this problem could have been partly solved by the
same technique as we used to explain deviations in the corporate
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product share.The share of unincorporated profits in total in-
come equals the share of profits in unincorporated product times
the share of the latter in total product.Each ratio should be fitted
separately.This would have been an extremely difficult task,
however, in view of the nature of the statistics.The profit ele-
ment of the unincorporated business sector is so mingled with
wages (and other) elements, that we did not attempt a further
breakdown of the data.
The fact that the share of unincorporated business income tends
to increase in mild recessions, is a partial offset to the stabilizing
influence of a declining corporate share.The saving rate out of
unincorporated entrepreneurial income is much higher than the
saving rate out of other forms of personal income.26Insofar as
the shift in income distribution is from corporate profits to unin-
corporated business profits, the net reduction in the saving rate is
less than if the shift were to other forms of income. On balance,
of course, the shift away from corporate profits during a recession
is still stabilizing with respect to consumption outlays.First, by
no means all of the shift is towards unincorporated income; note
the signs on the coefficients of the other income shares.Second,
the marginal saving rate out of unincorporated business income,
while higher than saving rates out of other forms of income, is
less than that of corporate profits.Third, as our 1922—41 regres-
sion indicates, a large enough decline in income will lead to a
decline, rather than an increase in the share of unincorporated
business income.Finally, the unincorporated business income
share is only in part entrepreneurial income.If we had data on
the pure entrepreneurial part of the total, we should undoubtedly
find that the shift toward such income, during mild recessions, was
much smaller than that shown in the postwar regression reported
in Table 12.
In both periods, the correlation coefficient for the employee
compensation share was disappointingly low.The regression
coefficients, however, did have the "right" signs.lATe tried adding
a variable representing the difference between the wage change of
the period and the "normal" increase in productivity, on the
assumption that such changes would have a lagged response in
See, for example, ri-win Friend and I. B. Kravis, "Entrepreneurial Income,
Saving, and Investment," American Economic Review, June 1957; and L. R. Klein
and A. S. Goldberger, An Econometric Model of the United States: 1929—1952,
Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Co., 1957.
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prices, and hence, depending on the sign, would tend to raise or
lower the wage share.However, the addition of this variable
improved the fit very little; moreover, its coefficient was exceed-
ingly small (although significant).
In part, the poor fit of the wage share results from a combina-
tion of factors.The wage share in the corporate sector is some-
what larger than the statistically reported wage share in the non-
corporate sector.Hence, the tendency of the wage share to rise
as output declines is partially offset by the greater than propor-
tional decline in the corporate sector.The over-all wage share,
as a function of deviations in output, thus depends not only on the
relation between wage shares and output deviations in each
sector, but also on the composition of output.Unlike the cor-
porate profit share, these two factors work in opposite directions
as output deviates from normal, so that the resultant fit between




In one major respect changes in factor shares during the 1937—38
recession do not fit the pattern described in this paper.The de-
cline in gross corporate product relative to the decline in private
nonfarm product was larger than in the 1953—54 or 1957—58
recessions.Our hypothesis would have predicted the opposite
result, since the magnitude of the decline in output was greater
in 1937—38 than in these later recessions.




The marginal ratio of the decline in gross profits to the decline in
corporate product, behaves as our hypothesis would indi-
cate.It is much lower than in the postwar recessions; we would
expect this, because the rate of decline in corporate product was
very large.Indeed between the third quarter of 1937 and the
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second quarter of 1938, industrial production declined by 36 per
cent—a rate of decline much larger than in 1953—54 or 1957—58.
The decline in corporate product relative to the fall in GNP, on
the other hand, was larger than in the last two postwar recessions.
This is possibly due to the fact that an unusually large part of this
recession was concentrated in the commodity producing sector
of the economy.It is possible, of course, that the statistics on
gross corporate product are not sufficiently accurate during these
earlier years to stand the weight of marginal calculations, particu-
larly in a short-lived, though very deep, recession.Although the
marginal ratio was unusually large from the point of view
of our hypothesis, the marginal ratio (=
was more or less in line with its expected value, in the sense that
it was noticeably lower than the ratios for the postwar cycles.
The ratio of the decline in gross retained profits to total profits
is very much smaller than in any other recession with which we
have dealt.The reason, of course, is that the tax on undistributed
profits, which had been in force during 1936 and 1937, was re-
moved in 1938.As a result, retained earnings, as a proportion of
total profits, were sharply increased in that year.The marginal
ratio has no meaning in terms of structural relationships.
Appendix 2
THE STATISTICAL DISCREPANCY
During recessions the decline in GNPwhenmeasured from the in-
come side of the accounts frequently tends to be smaller than when
measured from the product side, i.e., the statistical discrepancy
decreases.WTe have chosen to measure our marginal ratios in
terms of changes in GNP measured from the income side.All of
our data, including the corporate product data, were derived from
income statistics.Even the measures of farm and government
product, subtracted from GNPtoarrive at private nonf arm
product, were estimated from income data.The table below
gives the marginal ratios for each recession in terms of a
product measurement of GNP, for comparison purposes.The
regression equations for 1922—41 were all based on GNPdata
measured on the income side of the account.Due to an oversight,
not caught until all of the computations were complete, the post-
war regressions were based on GNP measured from the product
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side.Since the recession declines in GNP are slightly larger,
measured by product data, our b coefficients in the various regres-
sions where is a variable are biased slightly downward,
compared to the 1929-41 values.Raising the b coefficients would
strengthen rather than weaken all of the major observations made
earlier with respect to the relationship between the 1922—41 and
the 1948—59 regressions.
1929—33 1948—49 1953—54 1957—5 8
.27 .74 .46 .42
Appendix 3
DATA SOURCES
1922—29: The factor income shares, aside from corporate profits,
were based on Simon Kuznets, National income and its Corn posi-
tion, 1919—38, New York, NBER, 1941.The Kuznets data
were used to extrapolate the relevant Department of Commerce
1929 data back through the 1920's.In the case of interest,
Kuznets' figure was adjusted (with other Kuznets data) to exclude
netinterestpaid by government.Corporateprofitsbefore
tax + IVA were taken from Raymond W. Goldsmith's GNP
tables in Part V, Vol. III of A Study of Savings in the United
States (Princeton N.J., 1956).The other items of reconciliation
between GNP and national income were taken from the same
source.Gross national product was thus built upon the income
side.From 1922 to 1929 this estimate was quite close to the GNP
estimate of Kendrick (given in Goldsmith, Study of Savings), the
Department of Commerce (U.S. Income and Output, Table 1-16)
and Kuznets (two Kuznets estimates were available; the first from
his Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and Financ- -
ing(Princeton for NBER, 1961), and a second, based on the
national income data in his National income and adjusted by the
present author to the Department of Commerce concept wherever
possible, and raised to a GNP level with the reconciliation items
given by Goldsmith).
The various GNP estimates differed among themselves to some
extent, but not seriously, between 1922 and 1928.However, an
attempt to extend the data back to 1919, in order to cover the
1920—2 1 recession, ran into serious difficulty.First the Kendrick,
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Department of Commerce, and Kuznets estimates differed widely
in all three years, 1919, 1920, and 1921.Second—and even more
frustrating—the Kuznets factor income data, plus the Goldsmith
profit and reconciliation items, added up to a figure far below any
of the GNP estimates.Some items of income or other charges
are clearly underestimated, if any of the various GNP estimates
are to be believed.In Variant I of Appendix Table R-2 in Capital
in the American Economy, Kuznets adds a capital consumption
allowance estimate to his earlier national income estimates and
comes up with a GNP figure which is not too far from the Com-
merce estimate for 1919, 1920, and 1921 (after allowing for the
more important conceptual differences such as indirect taxes, cor-
porate taxes, etc.).However, the figures used in Kuznets' Ap-
pendix Table R-2 for reproduction cost depreciation seemed to be
noticeably higher than the Fabricant estimates of capital consump-
tion allowances, which had been the main basis for deriving the
net profit figures in the original national income estimates.More-
over, one of the major items of the Fabricant capital consumption
allowance was the figure for the reproduction cost depreciation
on residental housing.Yet the Kuznets description of the tech-
nique used to derive net rent, in National income, seems to imply
an original book value depreciation figure.Adding back a repro-
duction cost estimate of capital consumption allowances would
thus seem to overstate gross product since there was a sizeable
excess of reproduction cost over original cost during the years in
question.Therefore, even though Kuznets was able to reach a
total GNP not too far below the Commerce estimates for 1919
through 1921, the resulting distribution of gross income, for the
reasons described above, gave what seemed to be a distorted
picture.There appeared to be no major problems in other years.
All of the gross income shares were adjusted to exclude income
originating in the farm sector.Before using the Kuznets data on
unincorporated business income and net interest to extrapolate the
Department of Commerce data back through 1922, income of
farm proprietors and farm net interest were excluded.Farm
capital consumption allowances, as estimated by the Department
of Commerce (in the August 1954 Survey of Current Business)
were subtracted from total capital consumption allowances.
Corporate gross product was defined to equal corporate income
originating plus corporate depreciation. No attempt was made
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to allocate indirect taxes to the corporate sector.The corporate
income originating for 1922—28 was taken from the appendix table
in Osborne and Epstein (Survey of Current Business, January
1956).Corporate depreciation was taken from Fabricant, through
1937, and extrapolated through 1941 with data generously fur-
nished the author by Osborne.
For the 1922—41 period the wage and price data used in the
estimate of actual and normal costs are only rough approximations
to the corporate wage and price data theoretically required.The
private nonfarm GNP deflator was used to represent the price of
corporate product.Average hourly earnings, again for the private
nonfarm sector, were taken from the Joint Economic Committee
publication, Productivity Prices and incomes (Materials prepared
by the Committee Staff), 1957, Table 48, p. 141.The produc-
tivity figures used were those appearing in BLS Bulletin 1249,
Trends in Output per Man-Hour in the Private Economy, Decem-
ber 1959, Table 5, based on Kendrick's private nonfarm man-hours
and the Department of Commerce private nonfarm GNP.Since
the data were all in index number form, they were first converted to
absolute values (except the price index, and here the "quantity"
figure, of course, is set in terms of units to yield a price of $1.00 in
1954, the base year).
The figures on the output of commodities, services, and construc-
tion, were taken from Kuznets, National Product since 1869 (New
York, NBER, 1946), and linked to Department of Commerce data
in 1929, the latter contriling as to level.For the 1929—41 period,
services include only consumer services.Construction includes
both public and private construction.The data for 1948—59 are
based on the more exhaustive detail given in the new Department
of Commerce quarterly estimates on gross national product by
type of product (Survey of Current Business, November 1960).
1929—41: Except as indicated above, the data are all taken from
Department of Commerce estimates.
1948—59: The basic GNPandincome share data are from De-
partment of Commerce sources.However, Commerce does not
publish a quarterly series on private nonfarm product.To arrive
at this figure a quarterly estimate of government and farm product
was made, based on partial data.Government wages and salaries
are published quarterly, and the adjustment to compensation of
government employees requires only the interpolation of minor
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adjustment items, available annually.Farm gross product was
estimated by interpolating the annual adjustment items between
income of farm operators and farm gross product, and adding this
to the available quarterly figures on income of farm operators.
Corporate gross product, the corporate wage and price indexes,
and the corporate productivity figure were taken from Kuh
("Profits, Profit Markups, and Productivity").His estimates of
corporate gross product from 1956 through 1959wererevised in
line with the latest Commerce estimates.All of the data were
extended, using the techniques described by Kuh, through the last
two quarters of 1959.(Kuh's estimates end in the second quarter
of 1959.)
The estimations of "normal" private nonfarm GNP, normal
gross corporate product, and normal productivity gains are de-
scribed in the text.
COMMENT
BERT G. HICKMAN, The Brookings Institution
Professor Schultze introduces his stimulating paper with the
observation that other writers have recently emphasized the role
of cyclical shifts in the profit share as a short-term consumption
stabilizer.He has pushed well beyond other studies, however, in
his attempt to quantify some of the principal influences governing
fluctuations in the profit share and to assess how those influences
may themselves vary with the phase of the cycle and, as among
cycles, which differ in amplitude, duration, or both.
Schultze's basic hypothesis is that the share of profits in produced
income is positively related to the level of capacity utilization, for
two main reasons."First, as output falls relative to capacity, unit
overhead costs rise, with resulting lower profit margin.
Secondly,a rise in excess capacity should put pressure on profit
margins via its influence on ex-ante markups." He postulates a
"normal" profit share associated with "normal capacity output"
and relates short-term variations in the profit share to positive and
negative deviations of output from normal capacity.He employs
the conventional definition of normal capacity as that output at
which average unit costs are minimized.
More discussion of these postulates would have been welcome,
since they form the theoretical rationale for the causal interpreta-
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tions which are offered of the regression results, and yet there are
conceptual barriers to accepting the interpretations without reser-
vation.On Schultze's definitions, for example, the profit share
should fall below normal for output deviations to either side of
normal capacity, provided product price remains constant either
absolutely or as a proportion of factor prices.If normal capacity
is the output for which average unit cost is a minimum, it is irrele-
vant that unit overhead cost will decrease when output exceeds
normal, since the resulting rise of variable cost per unit must by
definition exceed the fall of overhead cost per unit.1
How then, may one account for the fact that Schultze's regres-
sions do indeed show that the profit share is above or below its
"normal" according to whether output is above or below "normal
capacity"?One possibility is that the empirical estimate of capac-
ity corresponds to the theoretical norm of minimum average cost,
but that the rise of average cost, which occurs when output ex-
ceeds capacity, is more than compensated for by a concomitant
price increase.In that case Schultze's second postulate—that ex-
ante markups will vary directly with the level of capacity utiliza-
tion—would be operative even though the first were not.
There is good reason to be suspicious of the foregoing rationali-
zation, of course, since there is nothing in the author's estimation
procedure to make it likely that the capacity index is an accurate
measure of theoretical normal capacity.He has estimated capacity
in such a way as to permit positive as well as negative output devia-
tions, but that in itself tells us nothing about the behavior of unit
costs on either side of estimated capacity.
Another, more plausible rationalization would run as follows.
Assume that average variable costs typically are either falling or
constant through a large range of observed output, as has often
been claimed in empirical cost studies, and that the range of rising
marginal and average costs is reached only rarely and sustained
only briefly during business upswings.Then Schultze's empirical
estimate of capacity may lie far to the left of the point of minimum
1 couldnot escape the difficulty by measuring output deviations from
maximum attainable capacity (the output at which average total cost approaches
a vertical asymptote) since the profit share would then increase through an
initial range of negative output deviations and decrease thereafter.Similarly, if
normal capacity were defined as the output at which average variable cost were
minimized, the only result would be to introduce an initial range in which positive
output deviations would increase the profit share—the latter would still fall for
larger positive deviations.
183SHORT-RUN MOVEMENTS OF INCOME SHARES
average cost, allowing plenty of scope for the margin-increasing
effect of falling unit overhead cost as output rises above estimated
capacity.Thus, it is unnecessary to rest all the weight of expla-
nation on variations in ex-ante markups.
Schultze also argues that "the excess-capacity hypothesis can
explain the phenomenon which often occurs during the later stages
of a boom, i.e., profit margins decline during a period in which the
absolute level of income is still rising."This argument rests on
the assumption that an increase of capacity in the face of an un-
changed output, will have the same kind of depressing effect on
profit margins as would a decline of output relative to an un-
changed capacity.The assumption is certainly open to question.
Insofar as costs are concerned, an increase of capacity—that is, a
rightward shift of the short-term cost curve—could easily reduce
unit costs at the old level of output if there were economies of
scale, and could do so even in the face of constant returns to scale
if the firm had previously been operating on the rising portion of
its cost curve.In addition, a firm would not necessarily reduce
its ex-ante markup while demand remains high and merely because
it has increased its capacity; quite possibly it deliberately attempts
to maintain a normal margin of overcapacity at the existing level
of output.
An alternative hypothesis may be offered to explain the lead of
profit margins over the downturn of aggregate income.It is in-
deed a fact that when aggregate production rises more slowly in
the later stages of a boom there is both an increase of aggregate
capacity, relative to aggregate output, and a decline in the aggre-
gate profit margin.This empirical correlation does not in itself
establish a causal relationship, however.As numerous National
Bureau studies have demonstrated, another development which
regularly accompanies a deceleration in the rate of increase of
aggregate output, is an increase in the proportion of firms experi-
encing absolute declines of output.Thus, in a substantial num-
ber of firms—a number approaching 50percent as the rate of
increase of aggregate output approaches zero—profit margins will
be falling because of output declines, despite the fact that aggre-
gate output is still rising.
It remains true, nonetheless, that the data show that in a majority
of firms, profit margins decline before output starts to fall—that is,
profit margins must be falling in some firms despite stable or rising
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outputs.It may be that the explanation of depressed margins in
these cases is the one offered by Schultze (that capacity increases
faster than output), but this cannot be established by appeal to
aggregative data since it would be necessary to show that capacity
was increasing relative to output in those particular firms.More-
over, there is another route by which margins could be depressed
in those firms whether or not capacity rose relative to output.
There will be a general pressure on profit margins during nor-
mal business expansions because of increases in money wages.
(By normal expansion I mean one not characterized by extreme
inflationary pressure owing to widespread excess demands, as in
1947—48 or 1950.)It is irrelevant in this context whether the
wage increases are autonomous or induced in the particular sectors
in which they originate.It need only be noted that wage in-
creases tend to become generalized throughout the economy,
whereas the ability to offset wage increases by price increases will
vary according to the demand prospects of individual firms and the
market structures of the industries in which they are located.
Hence, it is quite possible for profit margins to fall for firms whose
outputs are stable or rising, not because cost curves have shifted
to the right owing to increases of capacity, but because they have
shifted upward owing to increases in wage rates which cannot be
fully compensated for by price increases under existing demand
conditions.Indeed, an expansion of capacity in such cases might
reduce unit costs and prevent margins from falling as much as
otherwise.It should be unnecessary to add that this entire argu-
ment presumes a general constraint on aggregate money demand,
or to note that this is an eminently realistic assumption.
My next comments are directed to the empirical measurement of
capacity and its effect on the numerical estimates of the marginal
response of profits to output.Schultze states that the specification
of a higher or lower level of capacity against which to measure
output deviations would affect the a coefficient of his basic regres-
sion, which measures the "normal" profit share, but not the b co-
efficient, which measures the deviation of the profit share from
normal for a given deviation of output from normal.Evidently
he is assuming that a proportional change in the level of capacity
against which each output deviation is measured would change all
output deviations by the same absolute amount and merely shift
the vertical axis.This is not correct.Each deviation is corn-
185SHORT-RUN MOVEMENTS OF INCOME SHARES
puted as actual output minus capacity output divided by actual
output. A given proportional change in the level of capacity will
alter a large deviation relatively less than a small one, affecting the
values of both a and b.2
Apart from the mathematical point involved, the effects of
capacity measurement on the regression parameters is important
because Schultze's estimates of the response of corporate profits
to output change depend on them.Thus, the ratio of the change
of corporate profits to a given deviation of corporate income from
normal is equal to (a + b), and the corresponding elasticity is
given by (1 + b/a).If it were indeed true that only the value of
a were affected by the specification of capacity level, this would
mean that the derived profit-deviation slope would be dependent
on that choice.It is therefore of considerable interest to note
that not only do both coefficients depend on the specification of
capacity, but that their sum, and hence the derived slope, is in-
variant to that specification.
Thus, let each period's estimated capacity be raised or lowered
in the same proportion, so that the new capacity level for each
period is k times the old one.Then, if a and b were the coeffi-
cients of the original linear relationship between profit share and
output deviations, it can be shown from the formulas for the slope
and intercept of a straight line that the corresponding new values
will be as follows:
a' =a+b(1 —1/k) (1)
b' =b/k (2)
(3)
These relationships hold whether the transformation is for an
exact equation or a least squares regression.Hence, a change in
the specification of capacity by a constant proportion will not
affect the marginal relationship between profits and output devia-
tions (a + b), although it will alter the corresponding elasticity
(1+ b/a).
Thus far I have discussed the marginal relationship between
corporate profits and output deviations.It can also be shown that
the corresponding relationship between profits and output changes
is invariant to the specification of capacity. A casual glance at
the formula for the marginal relationship between corporate profits
'A given absolute change of capacity would also affect the relative deviations
unevenly.
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and corporate output would seem to contradict this statement,
since a is a free constant in the formula whereas b is multiplied by
another factor.The multiplicative factor itself depends on the
specification of capacity, however, and in such a way that a change
in the specification alters the values of a, b, and the multiplicative
factor, in a manner which leaves the marginal profits-output re-
lationship unaffected.
It may be concluded, then, that a proportional change in the
specification of capacity in the profit share regression, or of "nor-
mal GNP" in the corporate product share regression, would not
alter the derived marginal relationships and hence would not affect
the implicit multiplier values.Thus Schultze's major quantitative
results are not biased by the arbitrary nature of his capacity
estimates.
The remainder of my remarks will be directed to the implica-
tions of Schultze's findings for cyclical stability.First, it is clear
that gross corporate saving is a powerful automatic stabilizer in-
sofar as consumption demand is concerned.Moreover, this was
true even in prewar years, so that the multiplier was already com-
paratively small before the government fiscal stabilizers became
important.The fiscal stabilizers have indeed diminished the value
of the multiplier, since, as Schultze observed in connection with
corporate taxes (and as is also true of personal taxes), the in-
creased tax rates have not depressed corporate or personal saving
propensities.As I have reported elsewhere, however, the result-
ing decrease in the value of the multiplier is quite modest, espe-
cially for mild contractions.3
Secondly, the marginal response of corporate saving to national
product is larger for contractions than expansions.For this rea-
son, and because of ratchet or permanent income effects on per-
sonal saving propensities, the multiplier is cyclically variable.The
cyclical asymmetry of corporate saving is partly due to the divi-
dend lag analyzed by Lintner.Also important, however, is the
fact that gross profits absorb more of a decrease than they do of
an increase of national product.Schultze explains this tendency
by three factors: (1) the continued growth of capacity during the
downturn and recovery; (2) the fact that commodity production,
and hence corporate output, absorbs more of a fall of national
product than it does of the subsequent rise; (3) the fact that profit
See footnote 22 of Schukze's paper.
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margins must rise more slowly once the excess capacity inherited
from the contraction has been eliminated during the recovery
phase of the upswing.I have already expressed doubts about the
importance of the first of these three factors. A decrease of uti-
lization brought about by an increase of capacity need not neces-
sarily depress profit margins.
Finally, we come to Schultze's penetrating observations about
the extent to which induced changes in corporate saving will be
stabilizing during contractions which differ in amplitude and dura-
tion.Here as elsewhere he makes effective use of his resolution
of the marginal corporate saving ratio into three components: the
marginal response of corporate profits to corporate income, the
marginal response of corporate income to total income, and the
marginal response of corporate saving to corporate profits.The
second and third of these relationships are strongly affected by the
magnitude and duration of the decline, and hence account for most
of the difference in corporate saving behavior as between mild and
severe contractions.
I have nothing to add to the Lintner-Schultze analysis of the
tendency for the marginal ratio of corporate saving to corporate
profits to diminish as the contraction deepens and lengthens in dura-
tion.With regard to the remaining relationship, however—that
between corporate product and national product—it should be
noted that Schultze has abstracted from the relationship of invest-
ment to income change.
I do not have in mind the possible connection between corpo-
rate saving as a source of funds and corporate investment, since
external funds are plentiful during contractions.Rather, my con-
cern is with the fact that inventories are held primarily in con-
nection with the production and distribution of commodities.
Thus, the fact that most of the initial decline of final expenditure
is at the expense of commodities instead of services may stabilize
consumption through its effect on corporate saving, but it causes
inventory investment to decline more than it otherwise would.
Conversely, when at a later stage services begin to absorb more of
the fall in final demand, the favorable effect on inventory demand
will tend to offset the unfavorable effect on corporate saving.
Thus, variations in the value of the multiplier associated with shifts
in the composition of output are nullified at least partly by off-
setting variations in the value of the acceleration coefficient.
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